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We analyze from basic physical considerations the Darwinian competition for reproduction (evolutionary dy-
namics) of strategists in a Public Goods Game, the archetype for n-agent (group) economical and biological
interactions. In the proposed setup, the population is organized into groups, being the individual fitness linked
to the group performance, while the evolutionary dynamics takes place globally. Taking advantage of (groups)
permutation symmetry, the nonlinear analysis of the “mesoscale” Markov phase space for many competing
groups is feasible to a large extent, regarding the expected typicality of evolutionary histories. These predictions
are the basis for a sensible understanding of the numerical simulation results of the agent (microscopic) dynam-
ics. Potential implications of these results on model-related issues as, e.g. group selection, the role of “social
norms”, or sustainability of common goods, are highlighted in concise terms, before the conclusion.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,89.65.-s,87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding how cooperative behaviour emerges in dif-
ferent contexts remains an outstanding question in modern
evolutionary science(s) [1, 2]. The challenge posed by the
observation of cooperation, when selfish behaviour provides
higher fitness, has been studied in many different contexts,
from Biology [3, 4] to Economics [5] and Sociology [6]. Sev-
eral mechanisms have been proposed to explain this “cooper-
ation dilemma”. Among these, direct [7] and indirect (e.g.,
reputation) [8, 9] reciprocity rely on the idea that the cooper-
ative behaviour may be favoured by the probability of future
interactions; what has been termed network (spatial, lattice)
reciprocity [10], on the other hand is rooted on the (benefi-
cial) assortative effects of the topology of individual connec-
tions. Other proposals, as kin selection (inclusive fitness), that
refers to cooperation as favoring the reproductive success of
an agent’s relatives, even at a cost to the survival or repro-
duction of the individual [11], or group selection (competing
groups of individuals), got entangled with the old debate in
Evolution on multi-level (scale) selection, remaining open the
question of the effective replicator: the individual, the group,
the clade, the selfish gene, etc [12–14].
Although most of the theoretical [15, 16] and experimen-
tal [17–19] studies on cooperation have focused on pairwise
interactions, many biological [3], social [5], or economic [6]
systems which are interesting from the perspective of coop-
eration involve n-agent (group) interactions, and perhaps the
Public Goods Game (PGG) is one of the simplest, and most
studied, “group interaction” [20]. In this game, while only
cooperators contribute to the common good, both cooperators
and defectors benefit from it, that is, defectors are free-riders,
social parasites.
In the classical formulation of the PGG, for a constant in-
dividual cooperation cost, and a linear (as a function of the
fraction of cooperators) benefit function, defection is the ra-
tional choice and constitutes the only Nash Equilibrium of
the game. However, interior (mixed strategy) Nash equilib-
ria can be found for nonlinear convex benefit functions [21].
Other solutions proposed for the resilience of cooperation in
the evolutionary dynamics of PGG include structured popula-
tions [22, 23] or information exchange [24].
In this paper, we investigate in detail how the strategies (co-
operation or free-riding) of the PGG spread over the popula-
tion of players under perhaps the simplest possible set of as-
sumptions on the structure of agent contacts: Agents are par-
titioned in groups, each group constituting a fully-connected
subpopulation within which its members exploit a common
good, i.e., receive a payoff (benefit), that is a simple func-
tion of the abundance of cooperators in the group; this de-
termines the individual fitness (reproductive power) of each
agent. In order to implement the Darwinian competition for
strategy spreading we use the “well mixed” myopic replicator
dynamics (rule) [25], i.e.: “An agent imitates another, ran-
domly chosen from the whole population, with a probability
proportional to the fitness difference, if positive”. The model
is presented in section II. Two remarks are worth to make
at this point: a) From the perspective of the multi-level se-
lection debate, here we analyze a simple situation where the
replicator entity is the individual, but on the other hand, the
fitness of the replicator is “group specific”; in other words
the mesoscale (group level) is an essential component of the
model itself. b) A math-analysis property of the “replicator
rule” is its threshold character (“only imitate a fitter agent”).
This “non-analyticity” allows simple arguments in the analy-
sis of the model evolutionary dynamics.
In section III we study the mesoscale description leading to
a m-dimensional Markov process describing the evolution of
the fraction of cooperators in each of them competing groups.
The complete analysis of this dynamical system is greatly sim-
plified by the use of symmetry arguments, provided the com-
peting groups are equally sized (a generalization to unequal
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2sized groups is studied in Appendix VI C). First, in III A and
III B, we consider the cases of two and three competing groups
where the exact analysis and visualization of the phase space
portrait is greatly simplified by permutation symmetry con-
siderations. These symmetry arguments turn out to be valid
for any dimensions m, and we use them in III C. Our analysis
reveals the existence (at the mesoscale level of description)
of metastable symmetry-breaking macroscopic states. Exact
bounds for “meta-stability” are moreover analytically found,
due to the simplicity that remark b) above introduces in the
analysis.
In section IV the agents’ stochastic simulation for the evo-
lution of the fraction of cooperators in each group shows a
long term behavior in which the group cooperation values
fluctuate around some well defined values, accurately pre-
dicted by the Markov dynamics analyzed in the previous sec-
tion. Finally, in section V we discuss the implications of
the model in terms of the social norm, group selection, and
sustainability of the common good, together with the conclu-
sions.
II. THE MODEL
This is a simple model of evolutionary game dynamics,
where a population of strategists play a Public Goods game
(PGG), from where they earn their reproductive power, i.e.,
their fitness. A population of N = m × n agents is divided
into m groups, each one with n agents (Figure 1). Inside each
group, the agents play a Public Goods Game with two possible
strategies; cooperate (C) and defect (D). Let us denote by fCg
and fDg the payoff earned, respectively, by a cooperator and
a defector in the group g (= 1, . . . ,m). If ng is the number
of cooperators in group g and the individual contribution to
the public good is fixed to 1, these payoffs are, in the standard
linear PGG:
fCg =
rcg
n
− 1 , fDg =
rcg
n
, (1)
where the slope r > 1 of the payoff is often called “synergy
factor”. The fitness of an individual is assumed to be propor-
tional to his payoff. Equations (1) can be rewritten as:
fCg = rpg − 1 , fDg = rpg , (2)
where pg is the fraction of cooperator agents in group g.
To implement the Darwinian (natural selection) competi-
tion for strategic reproduction/spread, we choose the discrete
version of the myopic replicator dynamics [25, 26]. On one
hand, its continuum limit for pairwise games is, straightaway
[25], the well-studied replicator equation [27]. On the other,
its threshold character, see equation (3) below, i.e. “never
change state by imitation of a less fitted agent”, turns out to
be a source of simplicity in the analysis, as we will see below.
COOPERATOR
DEFECTOR
Figure 1: (Color online) Structure of the model. Strategist agents
are disposed in groups and can either cooperate or defect. Agents’
payoffs are proportional to the number of cooperators in their group,
cooperators having to pay an extra cost. Although agents obtain
their payoff (fitness) from their group, imitation takes place from
any group. In the diagram, solid red arrows represent the coopera-
tion invasion flows, and blue dashed arrows the defection flows. See
the text for further details.
The idea of this model es pretty clear, namely, fitness comes
from the group, while imitation takes place anywhere. Specif-
ically, at each time step, which represents one generation of
the discrete evolutionary time, all the agents play a one-shot
PGG and obtain a payoff. After that, the individuals syn-
chronously update their strategies in the following way: each
agent i compares its payoff with that of a random agent j
chosen equiprobably from any group, including own. Sub-
sequently, if agent j has a lower payoff than agent i, this keep
his/her strategy, while if it is higher i imitates j’s strategy with
a probability Πj→i proportional (wherefrom the term “my-
opic”) to the payoff difference:
Πj→i =
f j − f i
∆fmax
θ(f j − f i) , (3)
where θ is the Heaviside step function (θ(y) = 1 for y > 0
and θ(y) = 0 for y ≤ 0), and ∆fmax is an arbitrary strict
upper bound for the possible difference of agent payoff. It
fixes the characteristic time scale.
Note that for the simplest partition, where the game is
played by all agents altogether, i.e. m = 1, one realizes easily
from equation (1) that the extinction of the cooperative strat-
egy is the only possible evolutionary outcome. Free-riding is
an unbeatable strategy.
III. MARKOV PHASE SPACE ANALYSIS.
In this section we will consider equal sized groups of n in-
dividuals. As there is no networked structure of agents in-
3teractions (neither regarding imitation rule, nor inside groups
regarding payoff earning), the fractions (rational values, i.e.
l/n (l = 0, 1, · · · , n)) pg (g = 1, · · · ,m) specify the “rel-
evant” (regarding dynamics) instantaneous description of the
system’s state of cooperation. However, please note that, if
the term micro-state refers to the specification of the particu-
lar state of each agent, and these are distinguishable individ-
uals, each particular value of pg = l/n represents a different
number of micro-states, say Cnl .
The phase space is a (1/n lattice constant) grid over the
m-dimensional unit hypercube. The stochastic population dy-
namics introduced in section II defines a Markov process in
this phase space, the model dynamics.
We show below the analysis of the model dynamics for the
simplest cases, say m = 2 (III A) and 3 (III B), for which
a detailed geometrical investigation is feasible to visualize.
The arguments used in the analysis of these explicitly solvable
cases, are however easily seen to be valid for general values of
the number m of groups involved. We take advantage of the
simplicity that permutation symmetry (interchange of group
labels) considerations introduce in the analysis of the general
m case in III C.
In section IV stochastic simulations results are interpreted
to the light of the previous phase space non-linear analysis.
A. Two groups
Here, our phase space is the unit square. For equal sized
groups, the invariance by interchange of group label (meaning
that nothing at all changes if labels 1 and 2 are interchanged
everywhere) allows us to restrict attention to the simplex (tri-
angle) 0 ≤ p2 ≤ p1 ≤ 1. It is simple to realise that the flow
points outwards nowhere on the triangle boundary. Notwith-
standing this invariance, we will show in the illustrating figure
2 a “full” phase space portrait where this symmetry, at a first
glance, can be easily acknowledged.
The stochastic dynamics defined in previous section above
for the agents’ state evolution gives the following probabilities
for the four possible (changes) relevant outcomes of the time
step, say, increase or decrease of the number of cooperators in
either group. They are functions of the fractions pi (i = 1, 2)
of cooperators.
P+1 = 0 ,
P−1 =
p1
τ
(
(1− p1) + (1− p2)(fD2 − fC1 ) θ(fD2 − fC1 )
)
,
P+2 =
1− p2
τ
p1(f
C
1 − fD2 ) θ(fC1 − fD2 ) ,
P−2 =
p2
τ
(
(1− p1)(fD1 − fC2 ) + (1− p2)
)
,
(4)
where θ is the Heaviside step function (θ(y) = 1 for y > 0
and θ(y) = 0 for y ≤ 0), τ is the characteristic time scale
(here, τ = 2∆fmax), and e.g., P+1 is the probability of the
transition p1 → p1 +1/n, while P−2 stands for the probability
of decreasing p2 (by 1/n), etc ... In the previous formulas has
been applied fDi − fCi = 1. The flow on this (p1, p2) unit
square is (i = 1, 2):
dpi =
1
n
(P+i − P−i ) . (5)
First we locate the nullclines, dpi = 0, on the triangle.
1. dp1 = 0.
This locus includes the corners (0, 0) and (1, 1), and
the segment of the edge p1 = 1 of p2 values for which
fC1 > f
D
2 . The conditions f
C
1 = f
D
2 and p1 = 1 deter-
mine the upper bound, pth2 , of this branch of nullcline:
pth2 =
√
1 + 4r(r − 1)− 1
2r
. (6)
Note that for p2 > pth2 , dp1 < 0, and the flow on the
edge points inwards, while for 0 ≤ p2 < pth2 , the Heav-
iside function vanishes and the flow is co-linear to edge
(a cooperator in group 1 does not imitate defectors in
group 2).
2. dp2 = 0.
This includes the corners (0, 0) and (1, 1), and two
branches. The first branch is the segment 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1/r
on the edge p2 = 0. The second branch is interior to the
simplex, and its graph connects the points (1/r, 0) and
(1, p∗2), where p
∗
2 is explicitly computed as
p∗2 =
r − 1
r + 1
. (7)
We see that this nullcline shows a singularity at p1 =
1/r.
Due to the Heaviside θ functions in equation (4), there is a
line of singularities of the flow field, namely the intersection
of the locus fC1 = f
D
2 with the simplex. This is a curve con-
necting the points (1/r, 0) and (1, pth2 ), where the constant-
dp2 isoclines show a singular behavior, similar to that of the
dp2 = 0 nullcline, that we have seen above.
The stationary states (fixed points) of the phase space flow
have to be in the intersection of the nullclines. Thus there are
three fixed points (0, 0), (1, 1), and (1, p∗2).
In order to determine the stability properties of these fixed
points, one should first compute the flow’s Jacobian ma-
trices at them, whose spectral decompositions (eigenvalues
and eigen-subspaces) inform us (concisely) on their stability
against perturbations in the linear regime. .
The (i, j) Jacobian matrix’s element, expresses how a vari-
ation in pj , in the linear approximation, modifies dpi, i.e. it
is
Jij =
∂dpi
∂pj
,
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Figure 2: (Color online) Phase portrait for the two groups case.
A red dot indicates an unstable fixed point, a black dot a stable one,
and a blue dot indicates a saddle point. The green dots correspond
to the points (1, pth2 ) and (pth1 , 2). Gray (resp., purple) lines corre-
spond to nullclines dp1 = 0 (dp2 = 0), while arrows represent the
trajectories. Here, r = 4. See the text for further details.
and the results of the spectral analysis of the Jacobian matrix
at the three fixed points (see Appendix VI A for details) can
be summarized as follows:
(0, 0) Both eigenvalues are negative, as any fluctuation is
damped out. Thus, complete defection is a local at-
tractor. In fact, it is the global attractor for any initial
condition in the interior of the simplex.
(1, 1) Both eigenvalues are positive, meaning that cooperation
in both groups is a repeller fixed point. Any perturba-
tion (the appearance of a defector in either group) is
amplified.
(1, p∗2) This is always a saddle point. Its stable manifold is the
branch of the dp1 = 0 nullcline, the segment 0 ≤ p2 <
pth2 on the edge. The unstable linear manifold is tangent
to the interior branch of the dp2 = 0 nullcline. In Figure
2, the saddle (p1 = 1, p2 = p∗2) is represented by a
blue dot, and the upper point of the dp1 = 0 nullcline,
(p1 = 1, p2 = pth2 ) by a green dot.
Figure 2 displays the phase portrait for r = 2, where previ-
ous results can be checked by simple inspection.
B. Three groups
While we analyze here the case m = 3, we also keep an
eye on general m values, because several conclusions from
this analysis are easily seen to remain valid for an arbitrary
large number of groups in the system.
The set of micro-states is the unit cube. One easily realizes
that the fully defective corner (0, 0, 0) is a fixed point of the
dynamics. Also, it is easily seen that any small increase from
zero in the fraction of cooperators in one or more groups, in-
duces a restoring flow. Full defection is an absorbing state, an
attractor. On the other hand, the other fully symmetric cor-
ner, the full cooperation corner, (1, 1, 1) is also a fixed point,
but it is unstable against defective fluctuations in one or more
groups, and then is a repeller. The main diagonal connecting
both, i.e., the set of fully symmetric states, is a flow trajectory
of strictly decreasing value of cooperation in every group. In-
deed, after a little reflection, all this is true mutatis mutandi for
any value of m ≥ 2. In any dimension m of the phase space,
the set of fully symmetric micro-states is invariant and more-
over, any small fluctuation orthogonal to it induces a restoring
flow.
The remaining six corners of the unit cube are not fixed
points, for at least one group is full defective (and at least one
is full cooperative), and then a flow of increasing fraction of
cooperators in the full defective group is ensured. Also this
argument applies independently of the value of m.
Now we look for eventual fixed points on the twelve edges
of the unit cube. Due to the symmetry by labels interchange,
they are grouped into three classes of equivalence, that corre-
spond to invariant subsets under symmetry transformations:
• The three axes are an invariant set under symmetry
transformations. To fix ideas, think of the p3-axis, at an
abscissa 0 < p3. The components of the flow orthogo-
nal to this axis are both positive, thus we conclude that
the are no fixed points on the axes other than the attrac-
tor at origin. Note that this was already clear for the
two groups case; it is easy to realize that it is true for
any number m of groups involved.
• The six cube edges that are neither adjacent to the origin
nor to the (1, 1, 1) corner (e.g. the segment (0, p2, 1))
form the second equivalence class. In these micro-states
(points in these axes) there is one fully defective group
and the flow is non-null due to the zero payoff of its
defectors. Let us note that this simple consideration
leads also to the conclusion that the three faces of the
unit cube adjacent to origin cannot have on them a fixed
point other than the origin.
• The three cube edges adjacent to the full coopera-
tion corner, say the segments (p1, 1, 1), (1, p2, 1) and
(1, 1, p3), form the third class of edges. To fix ideas,
think of e.g. (1, p2, 1). For values of p2 large enough,
defectors in group 2 have larger payoff than cooperators
in the fully cooperative groups 1 and 3, and there, the
flow points towards the interior of the unit cube. If we
denote by pth the value of p2 for which fD2 = f
C
1 =
fC3 , and p1 = p3 = 1, i.e.
pth =
r + 1
2r
(√
1 +
8r(r − 1)
(r + 1)2
− 1
)
, (8)
the segment 0 ≤ p2 ≤ pth is an invariant set, in other
words, there the flow is co-linear to edge. Clearly,
5dp2 > 0 at p2 = 0, while at p2 = pth (where fD2 =
fC1 = f
C
3 ) intra-group imitation leads to dp2 < 0. Thus
there is a fixed point 0 < pˆ < pth inside the segment,
where the nullcline surface dp2 = 0 intersects the edge
(1, p2, 1).
To proceed in the search for fixed points located at the phase
space boundary, we have finally to consider the three faces
adjacent to the fully cooperative corner (1, 1, 1), that form a
class of equivalent faces. To allow for analytics, we explicitly
consider one of these, say the face defined by p3 = 1, and,
due to the symmetry by interchange of labels 1 and 2, we fo-
cus attention onto the triangular simplex p2 ≤ p1, as in the
previous subsection III A.
Note that we have already inferred the existence of a fixed
point (1, pˆ, 1) located at the edge. The replicator dynam-
ics defines the flow (5) on it with the following transition
probabilities (where τ is the characteristic time scale, here
τ = 3∆fmax):
P+3 = 0
P−3 =
1
τ
∑
i=1,2
(1− pi)(fDi − fC3 ) θ(fDi − fC3 )
 ,
P+1 =
1− p1
τ
(fC3 − fD1 ) θ(fC3 − fD1 ) ,
P−1 =
p1
τ
(
(1− p1) + (1− p2)(fD2 − fC1 ) θ(fD2 − fC1 )
)
,
P+2 =
1− p2
τ
(
(fC3 − fD2 ) θ(fC3 − fD2 )
+ p1(f
C
1 − fD2 ) θ(fC1 − fD2 )
)
,
P−2 =
p2
τ
(
(1− p2) + (1− p1)(fD1 − fC2 ) θ(fD1 − fC2 )
)
.
(9)
First we determine the region defined by P−3 = 0 (equiv.
fD1 < f
C
3 ), where the flow remains on the face. The con-
dition fD1 = f
C
3 defines a line p˜1(p2) which intersects the
edge (p1, 0, 1) at p˜1(0), and the symmetry line (p, p, 1) at
p˜1(p2 = p1). Note that the condition fD2 < f
C
3 is also satis-
fied due to our restriction to the p2 ≤ p1 triangle. The exact
analytical expression p˜(q), for the borderline p˜1(p2) is
p˜(q) =
1 + rq
2r
(√
1 +
4r(r − 1)(1 + q)
(1 + qr)2
− 1
)
, (10)
from which the previous intersection (p˜(0), p˜(p˜), and pth =
p˜(1)) points can be explicitly determined as functions of the
model parameters.
Only to the left of this line the flow remains on the plane
p3 = 1. We then see that the invariant segment on the vertical
edge, including the fixed point (1, pˆ, 1), is disconnected from
this region. On the contrary, the segment of the symmetry line
below p˜1(p2 = p1) is an invariant set included in the region,
where we now focus attention. At the lower bound (0, 0, 1)
of this segment the flow is positive, while at the upper one
(p˜1, p˜1, 1), cooperators in groups 1 and 2 imitate defectors,
thus the flow is negative. Thus, there is a fixed point (p∗, p∗, 1)
inside this segment where the nullcline surface dp2 = 0 inter-
sects the symmetry line. Note that being this line invariant,
the condition dp2 = 0 entails that also dp1 = 0. In fact, the
intersection of the dp1 = 0 nullcline with the face has two
isolated points, namely (1, 1, 1) and (p∗, p∗, 1), and the seg-
ment (1, 0 ≤ p2 ≤ pth, 1), which is isolated from the region
P−3 = 0.
We have found, regarding stationary states, that besides
(0, 0, 0) (attractor) and (1, 1, 1) (repellor), there are six sad-
dle fixed points:
• Three of them are located on the three cube edges adja-
cent to (1, 1, 1), at pˆ; each of them has a stable manifold
on the segment [0, pth] over the corresponding edge; it
is clear that fluctuations along directions orthogonal to
the edge are repelled away the fixed point, so that its
unstable manifold is two-dimensional.
• The last three fixed points are located at the symmetry
lines of the three faces adjacent to (1, 1, 1). The stable
manifold for each of them is a two-dimensional (see top
panel of Figure 3 compact piece of the corresponding
face. A fluctuation orthogonal to the face flows away,
along the one-dimensional unstable manifold.
The three-dimensional visualization of the flow in the 3d
phase space is dominated by the contraction of the interior
phase space towards the fully defective state. However, lo-
cated on three of the faces, there are co-dimension 1 invariant
sets that are the stable manifolds of stationary states where
one of the groups is fully cooperator, and the other two keep
the same mixed state of strategic population. Also, located on
the three cube edges, there are co-dimension 2 invariant seg-
ments that are the stable manifolds of stationary states with
two full-C groups. We have arrived to these results through
the use of exact and generalizable arguments.
C. Is more (groups) different?
The characterization of the deterministic trajectories in the
phase space of our Markov model carried out for m = 2 and
3 in the previous subsections was obtained through arguments
that are easily seen to hold for general values of m ≥ 2, pro-
vided the m groups are equally sized, and thus the symmetry
by label interchange is preserved. Thus, the following edu-
cated conjecture can be safely put forward:
C1 For any value of nf (1 ≤ nf ≤ m − 1) there are Cmnf
saddle fixed points, where nf groups are full-C, and the
rest (m − nf ) groups are mixed groups with a fraction
of cooperators p = pˆ(nf ,m). These states are equiv-
alent under (label interchange) symmetry transforma-
tions. Any of them has a co-dimension nf (m − nf
dimensional ) stable manifold.
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Figure 3: (Color online) Three groups case. Top panel: Represen-
tation of the unit cube (p1, p2, p3). Colored areas correspond to the
planar regions (co-dimension 1 stable manifolds) where one of the
three groups is fully cooperator. Bottom panel: Phase portrait for the
three-groups case restricted to the plane p3 = 1. The white area is
the basin of the full defection state, while blue area corresponds to
the stable manifold. The green lines correspond to the fC1 = fD2 and
fD1 = f
C
2 singularities, blue lines to the nullclines, and arrows to tra-
jectories. Inner black dot corresponds to the fixed point (p∗, p∗, 1),
and black dots located on the coordinate axes correspond to the fixed
points (pˆ, 1, 1), (1, pˆ, 1). In this plot, r = 4. See the text for further
details.
Note that the value of pˆ(nf = 1,m = 2) was computed in
III A as equation (7), while in III B, we denoted by pˆ what in
this general notation is pˆ(nf = 2,m = 3), and by p∗ what is
now termed pˆ(nf = 1,m = 3).
The function pˆ(nf ,m) can be easily obtained from the fixed
point condition, as the positive solution (provided it is less
than 1) to the quadratic equation
ap2 + bp+ c = 0 , (11)
with coefficients:
a = (m− nf )( m
nf
+ r − 1) ,
b = m− (r − 1)(m− 2nf ) ,
c = −(r − 1)nf .
One can quickly check that this result reproduces equation
(7) form = 2 and nf = 1. No cooperator in the full C groups
will become a defector as long as its payoff is higher than the
payoff of a defector in one of the “mixed state” groups. From
this consideration, one easily finds a lower bound pth(m,nf )
for the “fluctuation size” threshold of instability of the full C
groups. The value of this lower bound, below which stability
is ensured, is the positive root of the quadratic equation
a′p2 + b′p+ c′ = 0 , (12)
with coefficients:
a′ = (m− nf )r ,
b′ = (2nf −m)r + (m− nf ) ,
c′ = −(r − 1)nf .
This provides the exact functional dependence of our lower
bound of instability threshold pth on all model parameters:
m, nf , and r. In the same way, equation (11) provides the
exact functional dependence of the mixed cooperation level pˆ
on these parameters.
The mechanism that keeps a rather high average level of the
groups is the positive contribution to P+j (for mixed groups j)
from the imitation of full C group members. Simply said, the
level of full cooperation (p = 1) must be non-empty. Helas,
this mechanism is fragile, for there is an instability threshold
for fluctuations of the mixed groups cooperation, quantified by
pth, which restricts the stable manifolds of the fixed points to
compact subsets on (m − nf )-dimensional hypercubes . We
will pay due attention to this fragility in the next subsection
IV.
In the states that the conjecture C1 refers to, there are
groups with two different values for the fraction of cooper-
ators, and one wonders if more than two values for pg are
allowed in a fixed point. We now provide an argument sup-
porting that “more (groups) is different” [28], regarding the
fixed points of the Markov dynamics. More precisely, we will
argue below that
C2 There are metastable fixed points where groups with
more than two different values of group cooperation pg
coexist.
Consider one of the (type C1) stationary states with nf
groups at the level p = 1 and (m − nf ) groups at the ground
level p = pˆ. Now, choose one (the focal group, now on) of
these latter groups, and change its fraction of cooperators to a
value pup > pˆ, such that:
• pup < pth. This condition ensures that this change has
no influence on the nf groups in the full c level.
7• pup is high enough to make impossible the imitation by
cooperators in the focal group of defectors in ground
groups.
• The number m of groups is large enough to render very
small the effects of the focal group on the equilibrium
value of the ground level.
From the last two assumptions, one determines (see Ap-
pendix VI B) an analytical expression for pup as a function of
pˆ and model parameters. Provided this value satisfies the first
item above, this state can be taken as initial condition for the
numerical direct integration of the Markov (either discrete or
continuum) dynamics as a check of our third assumption, that
hopefully refine both, pup and pˆ, values. The results of the
numerical direct integration are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: (Color online) Ground and upper fixed points. The
graphs show the theoretical values of pˆ (solid blue line) and pup
(dashed orange line) as a function of r. The number of groups has
been fixed to m = 6, and the number of full-C groups to nf = 1.
See the text for further details.
The observations (that are quite generic, regarding variation
of parameters) fully support the existence of fixed points with
three levels of group cooperation, as well as its metastable
character (see section IV).
For a large numberm of groups, there is no apparent reason
that can forbid the existence of metastable fixed points with
ν > 3 levels of cooperation, at least for some range of model
parameters and occupancies of the ν levels, provided the full
cooperation level is not empty. Whenever two given levels
are known, the condition that cooperators in the upper level
have a higher payoff than free-riders in the lower level groups
fixes a threshold value, below which a new intermediate level
of cooperation can be (depending on ranges of parameters)
proved for meta-stability.
We see how, in this model case, “more” (groups) gives new
kinds of metastable fixed points, by further breaking the per-
mutation symmetry, and then “is different” [28]. We should
at this point emphasize that all the fixed points we have found
along this section III, other than “all groups are full C or full
D”, are only invariant under a proper subset of group permu-
tations. In other words, all of them are “symmetry-breaking”
states. Also, all of them have at least one group of full coop-
eration.
IV. AGENT-BASED STOCHASTIC SIMULATIONS: FINITE
GROUP SIZE FLUCTUATIONS AND PARAMETRIC
SENSITIVITY.
In the previous sections we have analyzed the dynamics of
the Markov model. This is different from, although intended
to mimic, the stochastic dynamics of agents that was a part
of the model formal definition in II. Indeed, the Markov dy-
namics is the mesoscopic (group level) description. The m
fractions pg are collective (group) variables, while any micro-
state of the system of agents is really specified by m × n bi-
nary values (C orD). The number µ of agent micro-states that
are associated to a point {pg} (g = 1, · · · ,m) in the Markov
phase space is
µ({pg}) = Πmg=1
(
n
npg
)
defining a non-uniform measure on the m-dimensional
Markov phase space, which is highly concentrated at inter-
mediate values of the group cooperation. When a stochastic
evolution from an initial agent micro-state is visualized as a
trajectory on the mesoscopic phase space, large amounts of
information are lost.
Also, while the Markov dynamics is deterministic, the up-
dating of agents strategy is stochastic. Boundaries in Markov
phase space that keep deterministic trajectories inside invari-
ant regions are easily crossed by stochastic trajectories
A convenient representation for trajectories of the many
groups system is simply provided by the m graphs for pg(t)
(g = 1, · · · ,m). In Figure 5 we show the time evolution of the
fraction of cooperators into the groups for two representative
realizations corresponding to different group sizes, n = 200
(top) and n = 1000 (bottom), together with the theoretical
values of pˆ and pup. As shown, the level of cooperation in the
groups oscillates around points pˆ and pup. This fact is clearly
displayed in Figure 6, which represents the histogram of the
fraction of cooperative agents into the different groups, after
the transient period and accumulated over 100 independent
realizations, for the same values than those used in the upper
panel of Figure 5.
The synergy factor r allows the agents to get a higher pay-
off for the same contribution, and helps enhancing the coop-
erators over the defectors. By increasing r, a given strategy
yields a higher payoff for the same cooperation frequency,
eventually allowing a cooperator in a group with cooperative
population nC + x to beat a defector in a group with coop-
erative population nC ; it substantially helps the cooperation
to maintain itself in a many-groups setup. In general, a full-
C group can resist invasion by defectors if r > n. In that
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Figure 5: (Color online) Stochastic evolution of the system. The
graphs show the time evolution of the fractions of cooperators for
two representative realizations of the six-groups case, each solid line
corresponding to a group. Dotted lines correspond to the theoret-
ical predictions for pˆ and pup. For small group sizes (top panel,
N = 200) fluctuations allow groups to exchange their levels of co-
operation, while for larger group sizes (bottom panel, N = 1000)
one group clearly detaches from the rest to occupy the upper fixed
point, and the fluctuations are not large enough to allow exchange.
In these plots, r = 6.
case, a single defector in a group of size n, which would earn
the highest payoff a defector could expect, would still receive
a payoff lower than cooperator in a full-C cooperator. For
r > n, a group reaching full cooperation will not leave this
state, as long as the fluctuations are not large enough to allow
the system to escape from that state.
It is interesting to look at the fluctuations to infer whether
cooperation is sustainable or not in this setup. As expected
and shown in Figure 5, fluctuations decay as the population
size increases. For high enough values of n, the system is sta-
ble; the fluctuations around the fixed point do not allow a de-
fector to beat a cooperator in the fully cooperative group, and
cooperation is maintained. This remained true even for values
of r of the order of n: indeed, the higher the synergy factor,
the less likely it becomes for a full-C cooperator to turn into a
defector. We argue, by contrast, that finite-size effects can be
dramatic: in some cases (typically n ≈ 10), the fluctuations
around the fixed point might allow a group to reach and over-
come the critical population level, allowing invasion of the
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Figure 6: (Color online) Histogram of cooperation level in groups.
The histogram counts the number of groups having a certain coopera-
tion rate after 200 time steps. The counts have been accumulated over
100 independent realizations. Dashed (resp., doted) line corresponds
to the theoretical predictions for pˆ (pup). Here, the parameters are
assigned the same values as in the upper panel of Figure 5: m = 6,
r = 6, and N = 200. The initial cooperation rates in the non full-C
groups are given by a Gaussian determined by µ = σ2 = n/4
full-C group by defectors; the system can not be considered
stable anymore in this case. Actually, the fluctuations follow
the inverse square root of the population size (experimentally
1/2
√
n), which gives us an estimate of the robustness of the
system as a function of the size of the groups.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
In this study, we have taken a public goods approach to
understand cooperative behavior in group-structured popu-
lations. In the proposed model, individuals are located in
groups. The fitness of the individuals is related to their group
performance, whereas the imitation takes place globally, that
is, agents have a global vision and can imitate the most suc-
cessful behaviors. We have shown that cooperation is main-
tained by a homogeneous group of cooperators. Note that this
fully cooperative group does not necessarily have to be related
to a physical group, but a social norm. In this sense, the exis-
tence of a cooperative social norm [29] can be interpreted as
a non-null probability of cooperation, which in the proposed
model is mathematically equivalent to a homogeneous group
of cooperators. This social norm can be based either on moral
principles or driven by both empirical and normative expecta-
tions [30–32].
The model is analytically solved through a Markovian ap-
proach, showing the existence of inner equilibria, invariant
manifolds and thresholds for metastability. It is worth not-
ing that although both individual and group levels are based
on the well-mixed approach, the model exhibits intermediate
rates of cooperation under the replicator dynamics. Further-
more, agent-based stochastic simulations show group cooper-
ation values fluctuating around the fixed points predicted by
the Markov dynamics, numerically validating the analytical
9predictions. Finally, this study has implications on the effect
of social norms and group selection on the sustainability of
the commons.
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VI. APPENDICES
A. Appendix: Jacobian for the two groups case
In this appendix we present the general expression of the
four terms of the Jacobian and the computation for J22 eval-
uated around the fixed point. Let us set F1 = fD2 − fC1 and
F2 = f
D
1 − fC2 . From (4) and (5), it follows:
J11 = p1 − (1− p2)
(
F1 + p1
(
∂(F1)
∂p1
))
θ(F1) ,
J12 = p1
(
(1− p2)∂(F1)
∂p2
− F1
)
θ(F1) ,
J21 = (1− p2)
(
F1 + p1
∂(F1)
∂p1
)
θ(−F1)
−F2 + (1− p1)∂(F2)
∂p1
,
J22 = p1
(
(1− p2)∂F1
∂p2
− F1
)
θ(−F1)− (1− p1)F2
−(1− p2)− p2
(
(1− p1)∂F2
∂p2
)
.
J22 value can be evaluated around the fixed point p∗ com-
puted in (7):
J22 = 2r
(
r + 1
r − 1 − 1
)
which is always negative for r ≥ 0.
B. Appendix: estimation of the upper fixed point
In this appendix we estimate the value of the metastable
fixed point pup discussed in Point C2 of Section III C. Let us
consider more than two groupsm > 2 and, at least, one full-C
group and more than one mixed groups 1 ≤ nf ≤ m − 1).
The polynomial equation for the population in the upper fixed
point pup is found by imposing C2 conditions in the replicator
dynamics, which drastically reduces the P− term and thus
results in a higher value for the cooperation frequency:
e(pup)2 + gpup + h = 0 , (13)
with:
e = nup
(
nup
nf
+ r
)
,
g = α(nf + nˆpˆ)− (r − 1)nup ,
h = (1− r)(s+ nˆpˆ) ,
where nˆ and pˆ represent the number of groups in the low-
est fixed point and their cooperation frequency, respectively,
and nup and pup represent the number of groups in the up-
per fixed point and their cooperation frequency. After a first
estimation of those values based on the assumption that the
variation of the ground value pˆ is small, a better characteriza-
tion of the fixed points can be obtained by refining the values
of the fixed points and of the mean cooperation iteratively un-
til convergence. The final value of the mean cooperation in
mixed groups p¯ is given by:
p¯ =
nuppup + (m− nf − nup)pˆ
m− nf . (14)
Since it is possible to compute the value of the mean co-
operation frequency in the general case, we can compute the
upper limit pth allowed for sustainability of cooperation. Let
ffC be the fitness of a cooperator in the full-C group, and f
th
D
be the fitness of a defector in the pth group. From the limit
condition:
ffC = f
th
D , (15)
it follows:
pthr = (r − 1) ,
pth = 1− 1
r
.
(16)
If in a group, the cooperation frequency overcomes this
value, cooperators in the fully cooperative group can turn into
defectors and the system would be in the basin of attraction of
the fully defective state.
C. Appendix: Unequal sized groups
An interesting way towards the generalization of this model
is to introduce disparity in groups sizes. Note that, considering
that all the agents have the same probability to be chosen for
imitation, larger groups will be more influential than smaller
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ones. This asymmetry may allow defectors in large groups to
invade small cooperative groups.
As in the case of equal group sizes, without a fully coop-
erative group, the system is in the basin of attraction of the
full-defection state.
Since the imitation probabilities depend on the size of each
group, the probabilities for a group i to increase and decrease
its fraction of cooperators pi by 1/ni become, respectively:
P+i =
ni(1− pi)
τ
m∑
j=1
j 6=i
njpj(f
C
j − fDi ) θ(fCj − fDi ) ,
P−i =
nipi
τ
m∑
j=1
njpj(f
D
j − fCi ) θ(fDj − fCi ) ,
(17)
where ni represents the total number of agents of group i, N
represents the total number of agents in the whole system, and
τ is the characteristic time scale involving ∆fmax and N .
The expression for the fixed point p∗ corresponding to all
the mixed groups (non full-C groups) sharing the same value
pi is obtained by setting P+i = P
−
i :
(N − nf )2p∗(1− p∗) = nf (N − nf )(1− p∗)(r − p∗r) ,
(18)
which yields the value of the fixed point:
p∗ =
nf (r − 1)
N − nf . (19)
A full-C group will resist invasion by defectors if:
ffC > f
g
D ⇒
r − 1
r
> p∗gng , (20)
where ng represents the size of the biggest group (excluding
full-C group).
Condition (20) relates the size of the fully cooperative
group, the size of the biggest mixed group and the synergy
factor r. It expresses whereas the full-C group can survive,
and therefore, whether cooperation is stable in such a system
or not.
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